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ABSTRACT
Due to their usage increase worldwide, iPads are on the path of becoming key sources of digital
evidence in criminal investigations. This research investigated the logical backup acquisition and
examination of the iPad2 device using the Apple iTunes backup utility while manually examining the
backup data (manual examination) and automatically parsing the backup data (Lantern software automated examination). The results indicate that a manual examination of the logical backup
structure from iTunes reveals more digital evidence, especially if installed application data is required
for an investigation. However, the researchers note that if a quick triage is needed of an iOS device,
then automated tools provide a faster method for obtaining digital evidence from an iOS device. The
results also illustrate that the file names in the backup folders have changed between iOS 3 and iOS 4.
Lastly, the authors note the need for an extensible software framework for future automated logical
iPad examination tools.
Keywords: iPad, forensics, logical backup, iOS, manual examination.
1. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of the iPad continues to rise. Consumers are attracted to its unique features, such as
increased storage capacity, user-friendliness, and the incorporation of an interactive touch screen. It is
considered to be more personal than a laptop and more advanced than a mobile phone (Miles, January
27, 2010). The rapid distribution of tablets to businesses and individual utilization is primarily due to
the Apple iPad device (Pilley, October 8, 2010). When Apple first released the iPad, they targeted
consumer sectors rather than business sectors. Their advertisements and marketing campaigns
reflected this strategy. However, the iPad is currently being adopted by an extensive scope of
consumers, ranging from children to executives. It is also employed in unconventional settings, like in
the hands of restaurant waiters as they take your order, or in boutique windows showcasing
promotional material (Geyer & Felske, 2011).
Since 2010, more than 25 million iPads have been sold in the US (KrollOntrack, 2011). Furthermore,
70% of the iPad2 buyers were new to the iPad world and 47% purchased a 3G model. This
demonstrates that not only are more buyers attracted to the iPad, but that consumers are looking for
always-connected iPad devices (Elmer-DeWitt, March 13, 2011). Due to the ubiquity of these devices,
criminals are starting to target iPad users, thereby committing a wider range of crimes (Pilley, October
8, 2010). Hence, digital forensic scientists need to focus on investigating these emerging devices.
Fortunately, new digital forensic tools and methods are being developed by researchers and private
corporations to help law enforcement officers forensically examine iPads, despite the challenging fact
that the iPad technology is continuously changing (Pilley, October 8, 2010).
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research focused on logical forensic methods for examining iPad devices. This research intended
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on answering the following questions:



What is the difference between using automated logical analysis of the backup files
versus using a manual approach?



What data is saved in the backup folder of an iPad2?



Where is the data saved and how can it be extracted?



What is the difference between the backup structure of the old iOS and the new iOS?
3. BACKGROUND
3.1. iPad

On January 27, 2010, the late CEO of Apple, Steve Jobs, announced the launch of a new tablet device
called iPad. On March 2, 2011, the second generation iPad2 was launched. Users could enjoy features
such as browsing the Internet, watching videos, viewing photos, and listening to music (Apple,
2011a).
With two cameras, high definition (HD) video recording capabilities, a dual core A5 chip, extended
battery life, WiFi Internet connectivity, third generation (3G) mini SIM card, an endless variety of
applications, and a thin and light design, the iPad2 stormed the technology market and created a new
era in the tablet world (Apple, 2011b). The iPad2 was released with the new version of Apple’s
operating system, iOS 4.3 (Halliday, March 2, 2011).
The following section explores the iOS file system in more detail.
3.1.1. The iOS File System
In 2008, Apple released iOS – an operating system for the iPhone, iPod, and iPad. This did not trouble
forensic investigators since the iOS used on the iPad was the same as that of the iPhone. Therefore, at
the time, no further studies were required, as they had been previously performed for the iPhone and
iPod touch. In April 2010, Apple took a major step by releasing iOS 4 which introduced further
notable features, such as multitasking, gaming features, video possibilities, and others (Morrissey,
2010).
Being familiar with all the features and having a good understanding of the Apple ecosystem was a
fundamental requirement for establishing a solid understanding of iOS forensics (Morrissey, 2010).
The iOS is a mini version of the OS X, which uses a modification of the Mac OS X kernel and its
development is based on Xcode and Cocoa (Morrissey, 2010). iOS is composed of four main
components; Cocoa Touch, Media, Core Services, and the OS X kernel. The first component, Cocoa
Touch, provides the technological infrastructure to employ the applications’ visual interface (Hoog &
Strzempka, 2011). The second component, Media, contains graphics, audio and video technologies
consisting of OpenAL, video playback, image files formats, quartz, core animation, and OpenGL
(Morrissey, 2010). According to Hoog & Strzempka (2011), the third component, Core Services,
delivers the primary system services for applications such as networking, SQLite databases, core
location, and threads. The OS X kernel which is the fourth component, delivers low level networking,
peripheral access, and memory management/file system handling (Hoog & Strzempka, 2011). It
consists of TCP/IP, sockets, power management, file system, and security (Morrissey, 2010).
Morrissey (2010) stated that the Hierarchical File System (HFS) was developed by Apple in order to
support the increased storage requirements of people. HFS formatted disks at the physical level are in
512 byte blocks, which is identical to Windows based sectors. An HFS system has two kinds of
blocks, logical blocks and allocation blocks (Morrissey, 2010). The logical blocks are numbered from
the first to the last on a given volume. They are static and are 512 bytes in size, just as the physical
blocks. On the other hand, allocation blocks are used by the HFS system to reduce fragmentation.
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They are collections of logical blocks joined together as clusters (Morrissey, 2010).
The HFS file system manages files by using balanced tree (B*tree), which is a catalog file system that
uses a catalog file and extents overflows in its organization scheme (Morrissey, 2010). B*trees consist
of nodes that are assembled together in a linear manner. This linear method increases the data access
speed by continuously balancing the extents when data is deleted or added. The HFS file system gives
a unique number (catalog ID number) for every file that is created, and increases by one each time a
file is added. The numbering of the catalog ID is tracked by the HFS volume header (Morrissey,
2010).

Figure 1. Structure of HFS+ file system

Adapted from IOS Forensic Analysis: for iPhone, iPad and iPod Touch, by Morrissey, S, 2010: Apress. Copyright 2010 © by Sean Morrissey

Figure 1 illustrates the structure of an HFS+ file system as illustrated by Morrissey (2010). The boot
blocks retain the first 1024 bytes. The subsequent 1024 bytes are retained for the volume header as
well as the last 1024 bytes of the HFS volume, which is reserved as a backup volume header. The
volume header stores information about the structure of the HFS volume. Next is the allocation file
which traces the allocation blocks that the file system is using. The following is the extents overflow
file which traces all the allocation blocks that belong to a file’s data forks. A list of all extents used by
a file and the connected blocks in the proper order is stored in this file.
The catalog file stores the volume files and folders' information that are in a hierarchical system of
nodes. There is a header node, an index node, leaf nodes, and map nodes. The attributes file is reserved
for future use of data forks, and the start up file is designed to boot a system which does not have a
built-in ROM support. The space after start up file is used by the file system for saving and tracking all
the data in a volume. The alternate volume header, as mentioned previously, is where the backup of
the volume header is retained. Disk repair is the main purpose for the alternate volume header. Finally,
the last chunk of HFS file system structure are the 512 bytes, which are reserved (Morrissey, 2010).
The file system for Apple portable devices is HFSX, but has one main difference from the HFS+. The
difference is that the HFSX is case sensitive, thereby allowing the file system to distinguish between
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two files that have the exact identical name. For instance, both test.doc and Test.doc can be created on
the HFSX file system (Morrissey, 2010).
According to Cellebrite (2011), two partitions are included in the Apple devices. The first partition is
the system partition, which is about 1 GB. The iOS and basic applications are stored in the first
partition (G´omez-Miralles & Arnedo-Moreno, 2011). Although encryption may be enabled on the
iDevice, the system partition is not encrypted (Cellebrite, July 3, 2011). However, the second partition
is the one of interest, as it holds all the user data that can have evidentiary value. This partition
includes all the photos, messages, GPS, videos, and other data that is generated by the user (Cellebrite,
July 3, 2011). Extracting the protected files can be a challenge if encryption is enabled (Cellebrite,
2011).
3.1.2 Related Work
A paper by Luis G´omez-Miralles and Joan Arnedo-Moreno explored the method of obtaining a
forensic image of the iPad using a Camera Connection Kit. The advantage of their method was the
ability to decrease time by attaching an external hard disk to the iPad using a USB connection. Their
method consisted of two parts. The first part was setting up the device by jailbreaking it. The second
part was to acquire a forensic image, by connecting Apple’s Camera Connection Kit, which was used
to mount the USB hard drive. Next, was to obtain a forensic image using the dd command (G´omezMiralles & Arnedo-Moreno, 2011).
Another research study by Mona Bader and Ibrahim Baggili, explored the forensic processing of the
third generation of Apple iPhone 3GS 2.2.1 by using the Apple iTunes backup utility to retrieve a
logical backup. Their research showed that the Backup folder with its backup files contains data that
has evidentiary value, as the iPhone file system saves the data in binary lists and database files.
Additionally, their results showed that XML format plist files are used to store device configuration,
status, and application settings. Bader and Baggili (2010) stated that the backed up files from the
iPhone contain information that could have evidentiary significance such as text messages, email
messages, and GPS locations. The manual examination introduced in this paper is an extension of their
work to the iPad2 device.
4. DESIGN – METHODS AND PROCEDURES
The methodology in this research takes into consideration the Computer Forensics Tool Testing
guidelines established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (NIST, 2003). At
a high level, the authors followed the following procedures:
1. Certain scenarios were entered onto three iPad2 devices
2. The devices were backed up (logically acquired)
3. The backup folders were then parsed using automated forensic tools and manually
4. The results were compared
After the scenario was created, the iPad2 was geared up for logical acquisition. The specifications of
the devices used in the acquisition process are listed in Table 1. Then, the forensic tools were chosen
to perform the logical acquisition. After reviewing some of the available tools' specifications and their
ability to support iPad logical data extraction, Katana Forensic Lantern was chosen.
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Table 1. Hardware Specifications
Device

Forensic Workstation

iPad

Specification
MacBook Pro
Mac OS X
Version 10.6.8
Processor: 2.26 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo
Memory: 2 GB 1067 MHz DDR3
iPad 3G + WiFi
Storage: 64 GB
iOS: 4.10.01
Table 2. Software Specifications

Software
Katana Forensic
Lantern
iTunes
iPhone Backup
Extractor
PlistEdit Pro

SQLite Database
Browser
Google Earth

Details
Version 2.0 operatable on:
Minimum of Intel based Mac OS X 10.6 with preferably 4GB
memory
Downloaded from: http://katanaforensics.com/
iTunes 10 version 10.4.1 (10)
Version 3.0.8
Downloaded from:
www.iphonebackupextractor.com
Version 1.7 (1.7)
Downloaded from:
http://www.fatcatsoftware.com/plisteditpro/
Version 1.3
Downloaded from: http://sqlitebrowser.sourceforge.net
Version 6.0.3.2197
Downloaded from:
http://www.google.com/earth/download/ge/agree.html

Logical Acquisition Approach
Logical backups contain a vast amount of data that includes all sorts of evidence (Bader & Baggili,
2010). They are able to connect many dots, in any case, by providing further information about the
computer that was previously used to synchronize the iDevice, and the owner of the device, including
his/her interests and whereabouts (Bader & Baggili, 2010).
The logical backup was captured through the iTunes utility using a Mac OS X version 10.6.8. The
system utilizes Apple’s synchronization protocol in order to have all of the iDevice's data copied to the
forensic workstation (Bader & Baggili, 2010).
It is important to note that any automatically initiated backup on iTunes may contaminate the iDevice
by transferring data from the forensic workstation to the iDevice as a part of the synchronization
(Bader & Baggili, 2010). This was noted, and steered clear of, prior to connecting the iPad to the
forensic workstation by disabling the synchronization option in iTunes.
The logical backup folder was parsed using different methods: first, by using Katana Forensic Lantern.
This software directly acquires the backup from the iDevice – provided that the automatic
synchronization with iTunes is turned off; second, by using the iPhone Backup Extractor tool that
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presents the backup data in a more visually appealing form than the original data; and third, through a
manual examination of the backup folder.
Other software and tools were required to manually investigate the backup data such as the SQLite
Database browser, PlistEdit Pro, and TextEdit as mentioned in Table 2. In order to prepare the iPad2
and backup data, a scenario was created on the iPad, by adding notes, email accounts, address book
entries, photos (taken with the location option being On and Off), calendar entries and bookmarks.
Then, the backup process was initiated using Mac OS X version 10.6.8 through iTunes version 10.4.1
(10). More specifications are included in Tables 1 and 2.
It must be noted that all the tests were conducted under forensically acceptable conditions, thereby
avoiding any illegal access to the device through jailbreaking, especially since the main objective was
to not contaminate the original data stored on the iPad2. According to Kruse & Heiser (2002), there
are four key phases to follow in computer forensics processes, which are, access, acquire (logical),
analyse, and report. These steps were followed in this research.
4.1. Instruments
4.1.1. Katana Forensic Lantern
Lantern is one of the iOS forensic solutions currently available on the market, developed by Katana
Forensics. It is well known for its low cost, yet fast and effective results. It enables acquiring the
logical portion of three different iOS devices: iPhones, iPads and iPod Touch (Morrissey, 2010). After
the device is connected to the forensic computer, Lantern backs up the files and allows the
examination of data while it is still processing. Timeline analysis and geographic data features are also
supported (KatanaForensics, 2011b).
The software has an intuitive user interface. It is as simple as opening a new case, entering the case
and evidence details, and then acquiring the device (KatanaForensics, 2011b). The maximum time for
acquiring the iDevice ranges between 5 to 30 minutes, depending on the size of the device (Morrissey,
2010).
4.1.2. iTunes
Media player, digital media organizer, and iPhone/iPod/iPad content manager, are the features that the
iTunes application offers since its introduction in 2001. It also connects to the iTunes Store and
enables online content purchases (Apple, 2011c).
iTunes operates on both iOS and Windows, and is available for download, with no charges, through
Apple’s portal. It is primarily used to maintain media, applications, books, and content purchases, and
are all synchronized with the owner's Apple devices. It creates backups of all the settings and media of
the connected devices such as iPods, iPhones and iPads. These backups restore the captured settings
and details of the devices (Apple, 2011c).
4.1.3. iPhone Backup Extractor
iPhone Backup Extractor is a freely available tool that can parse data from the iPhone’s backup folder
(ReincubateLtd, 2011). According to Morrissey (2010), it has the ability to convert the backup folder
into CSV, VCard, or ICAL formats, so they can be easily viewed. It can also convert Keyhole Markup
Language (KML) files for use with Google Earth if any location data is included. KML is an XML
markup language used by map-related software for marking maps (Goldberg & Castro, 2008).
Although iPhone Backup Extractor it is not considered to be a forensic tool, it provides means for
examiners to analyse backup folders (Morrissey, 2010).
4.2. Data Collection and Analysis
4.2.1. Katana Forensic Lantern
When the acquisition process was complete, the following extracted data was shown:
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Device Information: It provided general information about the device being acquired such as device
name, type, model, serial number, and software version.
Contacts: This pane showed the phone book saved on the iDevice. It also showed all the related data
to a contact in one single screen.
Notes: Thoughts, ideas, points, lists, and many more things can be typed in this application and may
be used as evidence in an investigation.
Calendar: The calendar may include a great sum of information. It may contain appointments, events,
notes, and important dates synchronized from many different devices and applications used by the
user. Lantern’s software parses all the data and alerts if they are occurring (Morrissey, 2010).
Internet: Considering the nature of the investigation being carried on, this section is of great
importance. Lantern provides a clear list of all Internet bookmarks, displayed pages, and browsing
history from the web surfing program on the iPad, which is Safari.
Gmail: This pane shows all the registered email accounts on the iPad. In this case, the tested device
had a Gmail account set up, and all related emails, their contents, sender and receiver related
information were displayed.
Dictionary: Each time text is typed on the iPad, it is logged and saved, and can be acquired during the
investigation. Those entries can appear from texts typed into the device and are ordered in the dynamic
dictionary file.
Maps: iPad users may record maps and routes into their handheld devices. All those details are parsed
and can be exported to Google Maps to show more graphical details and more specific locations.
Those details, in turn, can be exported to Google Earth so they can be plotted on a map.
WiFi: Shows a chronological order of all the WiFi connections attempted using the iPad, SSID,
BSSID, and the security of that connection. This can be useful in capturing the access points the
device was connected to.
Photos: This pane may be one of the most important panes for the investigator due to the richness of
the information that it offers. All images taken with the built-in camera include Exchangeable Image
File Format (EXIF) and embedded geographical data (KatanaForensics, 2011b). Those images can be
identified using Lantern and are also clearly viewed within the program itself. Lantern can extract the
geographical data from EXIF so that the location can be easily plotted on Google Maps, illustrating
where the photo was taken (Morrissey, 2010).
Google Earth: Interesting data was found within the Exif associated photos taken using the built-in
camera of the iPad. If the location service is on, it records the longitude and latitude of the exact
location of where the photo was taken, along with other details about the camera type, aperture value,
and many more related data. This data may be exported into a .kmz format, which then could be
opened using Google Earth and show its exact location on the map.
Report: Lantern provides an option of exporting all the acquired data into html format. This
summarizes all the panes and their related data into one page – which is easier to navigate through. It
also provides the source file from which the data was extracted.
Third Party Applications: Although Lantern was of a great assistance in examining the evidence on
iDevices, it did not provide significant details about third party applications installed on the iPad. Yet,
it was possible to manually navigate through the exported report and find some related data to those
applications.
4.2.2. iPhone Backup Extractor
iPhone Backup Extractor is not intended to serve as a forensics tool (Morrissey, 2010). It essentially
parses the extracted backup folder into useful folders and file formats that, in turn, make it easier for
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the examiner to go through (ReincubateLtd, 2011). Moreover, it parses the data in a more organized
way and sorts it neatly e.g. .plist, .sqlite3, & .db files (Morrissey, 2010). iPhone Backup Extractor is
not complicated and does not need any special knowledge to run and use (ReincubateLtd, 2011).
The following descriptions are files of interest extracted using the iPhone Backup Extractor:
Keychain-backup.plist: This file contains important tables such as the genp and inet. The tables
contain accounts, their encrypted passwords, and related services (Bader & Baggili, 2010).
Library: This folder contains most of the important data that can be found within the backup, such as
the saved entries in the Address Book (and the related images to each entry), Calendar, Keyboard
entries, Notes, Safari and more. The files are in .sqlite3 format and .db or .plist.
Media: Media folder parses the photos and their data into their relative folders.
Ocspcache.sqlite3: This database seems to include the digital certificates.
SystemConfiguration: This folder shows a collection of PList files that contain data about networks
the device is connected to, their preferences, and the power management details.
TrustStore.sqlite3: This database contains the CA certificates that the iPad trusts. The CA certificates
are used for security credentials and message encryption by using public keys (SearchSecurity.com,
2011).
Com.facebook.Facebook: This backup folder holds all the data related to the facebook account
associated with the iPad under investigation. A database of all the facebook friends’ networks can also
be found in .db format.
Dynamic-text.dat file (Dictionary): Any text entered in the iPad is logged into a file called dynamictext.dat. This file can be of a great help to the investigator due to the insight it provides about the
suspects usage of the device. It can potentially direct the whole investigation into the proper path by
providing solid facts.
com.skype.Skype: Skype provides video calls, screen sharing, and many more features. It can
potentially reveal a lot about the suspect's personality and provide corroborating evidence. The
database contains many tables such as Accounts, CallMembers and ChatMembers.
com.apple.ibooks: This database mainly holds details about all electronic books and .pdf files added
to the iBook application. It shows plenty of interesting related details such as the title of the item, the
author, and the categories. This could provide further details about the personality of the suspects and
their interests.
Com.linkedin.Linkedin.plist: This PList file holds details of the Linkedin account used on the
iDevice. It mainly shows general user profile details such as user name, job title, associated twitter
accounts, pictures, and a link to the user profile and photo URL.
4.2.3. Manual Examination of iTunes Backup Folder:
A manual examination of the iTunes backup folder was conducted without using any automated tools
to parse the files. The backup folder contained more than 2000 files. These files consisted of different
kinds of files, such as PLists, SQL databases, images, HTML files, and more.
As a part of the backup folder, three main PList files were generated; Info.plist, Status.plist, and
Manifest.plist. In Manifest.plist, a metadata file identifies the .mddata and .mdinfo files. The
Status.plist file holds the status of the backup, i.e. if it was completed successfully, and the date and
time of the backup.
Another file contained within the backup folder was the Info.plist. This plist file holds details about
the backup and other information regarding the iDevice (GitHub, 2011). Other files found in the
backup folder are Manifest.mbdb and Manifest.mbdx. These are binary index files that contain the
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names and paths of the files in the backup (LeMere, 2010). It also contains the real names of the files
representing the random strings in the backup folder (Ley, 2011). The .mbdb file holds the data of the
original files, and the .mbdx contains pointers to those files in the .mbdb file as well as the hex file
names included within the backup folder (ROYVANRIJN, April 21, 2011). Furthermore, the .mbdb
also contains a file header which holds the version number of mbdx and the number of records present
in the mbdx file (LeMere, 2010).
The following is the list of some of the files of interest found using the manual examination method:
Dynamic Dictionary: Found in 0b68edc697a550c9b977b77cd012fa9a0557dfcb.
iBooks:
The
SQLite
database
of
1c955dc79317ef8679a99f24697666bf9e4a9de6.

iBooks

is

contained

within

the

file

Skype: Many files related to the Skype application were found and examined – most of which were
text files containing encrypted data, except the user names involved in the video calls were in clear
text. In addition, a SQLite database was found with relevant data to the calls carried out, the duration,
involved usernames, and language used. The SQLite DB had the following name:
a6414be1fc3678b0ea60492a47d866db3a6d4818 file and its related Plist file had the following name:
5c7504d4b4aa4395d7b3651bc0d523de121c3159. It was also found that the hash value of the
application was not constant amongst multiple tested devices.
Bookmarks:
Bookmarks
database
is
contained
within
the
file
named
d1f062e2da26192a6625d968274bfda8d07821e4 and contains many different tables within its database
with data related to the bookmark URL and the title of each link.
Notes: Contains details about the notes saved on the device. The SHA-1 value is
ca3bc056d4da0bbf88b5fb3be254f3b7147e639c
Twitter: Twitter data was in PList format and contained the usernames and content of tweets
exchanged amongst them. The related SHA-1 values for the twitter application files were as follows:
1ae8b59701a8ef5a48a50add6818148c9cbed566
2ba214fcde984bbc5ea2b48acd151b61b651c1c8
4eb24cb35ff5209d08774a6d2db4c98a0449a9ff
7a0c2551ecd6f950316f55d0591f8b4922910721
71127e4db8d3d73d8871473f09c16695a1a2532c
c5dc95a1b0c31173c455605e58bffcca83d8b864
Connection WiFi: The file 3ea0280c7d1bd352397fc658b2328a7f3b1243b in all three tested iPads
contained related data to the WiFi and network connections.
Gmail Contacts List: An interesting finding of the manual examination was a SQLite database file
containing email accounts, names, and mobile numbers of the registered Gmail account on the iPad.
The findings contained information that was not initially entered for each contact in the list but was
synchronized with a Blackberry device Address Book of the owner.
The Gmail account is set up on the Blackberry and is synchronized with the device’s contact list. All
contacts' mobile numbers were found in the backup folder since that Gmail account was also set up on
the iPad under examination. This could lead an investigator to find a suspect's contact numbers, so
long as they were mainly saved on his/her mobile device.
The
relative
PList
file
to
this
application
is
named
Linkedin:
9c404eb0aa691005cdbd1e97ca74685c334f3635 and provides details such as the first name, last name,
user name, profile URL, and the job title.

121

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2012
Calendar: The calendar contains two relative files in the backup folder, a SQLite database and PList.
The former is saved under 2041457d5fe04d39d0ab481178355df6781e6858 and the latter under
d351344f01cbe4900c9e981d1fb7ea5614e7c2e5.
Keychain: This file was found in 51a4616e576dd33cd2abadfea874eb8ff246bf0e and contains genp,
cert, inet, and keys tables. These tables provide more data about the accounts registered on the device
along with their relative passwords and details.
Table 3. Backup files and their relative applications
Backup
Keychain
WiFi Connections

File Type
PList
PList

PList
SQLite
PList
PList
PList
SQLite
PList
PList
SQLite
PList
PList
SQLite
PList
PList

Backup File
51a4616e576dd33cd2abadfea874eb8ff246bf0e
3ea0280c7d1bd352397fc658b2328a7f3b1243b
ade0340f576ee14793c607073bd7e8e409af07a8
0b68edc697a550c9b977b77cd012fa9a0557dfcb
1c955dc79317ef8679a99f24697666bf9e4a9de6
51fca3a3004e8f8e08f37a0a5ac3d7512274ee24
1ae8b59701a8ef5a48a50add6818148c9cbed566
2ba214fcde984bbc5ea2b48acd151b61b651c1c8
4eb24cb35ff5209d08774a6d2db4c98a0449a9ff
7a0c2551ecd6f950316f55d0591f8b4922910721
71127e4db8d3d73d8871473f09c16695a1a2532c
c5dc95a1b0c31173c455605e58bffcca83d8b864
9c404eb0aa691005cdbd1e97ca74685c334f3635
d1f062e2da26192a6625d968274bfda8d07821e4
5f0a990d1c729a8b20627e18929960fc94f3ee6b
5fd03a33c2a31106503589573045150c740721dd
06af93e6265bf32205de534582c3e8b8b3b5ee9e
19cb8d89a179d13e45320f9f3965c7ea7454b10d
36eb88809db6179b2fda77099cefce12792f0889
52c03edfc4da9eba398684afb69ba503a2709667
ca3bc056d4da0bbf88b5fb3be254f3b7147e639c
06642c767b9d974f12af8d72212b766709ba08fe
59445c4fae86445d6326f08d3c3bcf7b60ac54d3
2041457d5fe04d39d0ab481178355df6781e6858
d351344f01cbe4900c9e981d1fb7ea5614e7c2e5
9281049ff1d27f1129c0bd17a95c863350e6f5a2

Dynamic Dictionary
iBooks

Text
SQLite
PList
PList

PList
SQLite
PList
SQLite

a2d4e045244686a6366a266ba9f7ef88e747fe4b
bedec6d42efe57123676bfa31e98ab68b713195f
d00b419a7c5cbffd19f429d69aff468291d53b00
f936b60c64de096db559922b70a23faa8db75dbd

Twitter

LinkedIn
Bookmarks
Google+
Mail Accounts
Airplane Mode
Browser History
Keyboard options
Notes
Last Sleep
Audio Player details
Calendar
Safari Active
Documents
Mailbox details
Photos
Dropbox
Ocsp

4.3. Challenges
Generally, investigators may face challenges no matter what device is being examined. However,
since criminals continue to develop novel methods to cover their tracks, digital forensics has to
constantly evolve with many technologies being introduced to defend against those harmful attacks
(Husain, Baggili, & Sridhar, 2011).
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A challenge that can be faced in a case is a locked iPad device. Since this is a user entered PIN, there
are no default codes provided in the user manual providing an investigator with a limited number of
attempts to try different passwords. As a security precaution offered by Apple on all iDevices,
multiple unsuccessful attempts may lead to erasing all data on the device.
Examiners should consider the following when a locked iDevice is being investigated (Apple,
September 22, 2011):


Repeatedly entering the wrong password on the iDevice will lead it to being disabled for a
certain period of time, starting with 1 minute. The more the unsuccessful attempts, the longer
the disabled interval will be.



Too many unsuccessful attempts will lead to not being able to gain access to the iDevice until
it is connected to the computer it was originally synchronized with.



The user may have configured the device to erase itself after a certain number of consecutive
unsuccessful attempts.

There are many ways to obtain the PIN of a locked device during an investigation (Punja & Mislan,
2008):


Using common PIN numbers, such as the last 4 digits of the owner’s phone number, the year
of birth, or any other related PIN that is found during the investigation.



Obtaining it directly from the owner.



Brute force attack (but may be inapplicable in case of having a limited number of attempts).

Few software vendors claim now to provide features that take the investigation further by decrypting
the forensic images captured and obtaining the passcode within 20-40 minutes depending on the
passcode complexity through brute-force. Katana Forensics provides a complimentary application to
their original Lantern program that images iOS devices. Since the complimentary software was
released after the completion of this experiment, the newly added features were not tested.
Another software, Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit, provides similar features to Lantern Lite. The
former has iOS 4.x and iOS 5 Passcode Recovery. This forensic tool also performs a brute-force
attack, even for complex passcodes. It also obtains the encryption keys from the iDevice.
Another challenge is the differences in the iPhone backup structures depending on the installed iOS
version. Since the early versions of the Apple firmware, there have been changes in the backup
formats and structures. It started with .mdbackup files to .mddata and .mdinfo in the 3G iPhone and
iOS 3.0. The former file type contained data related to the phone, where the latter held the respective
metadata (Morrissey, 2010).
Once iOS 4.0 was released, a new backup structure was introduced. The hashed filenames still held
the data but without the .mddata and .mdinfo extensions (Morrissey, 2010). Instead, everything was
stored in manifest.mbdb. This database contains the full path and filenames, and could be viewed
using TextEdit (Hoog & Strzempka, 2011).
5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
We share below the summary of our findings from performing this research. A comparative summary
is also provided in Table 4.
Katana Forensic Lantern:


Provides detailed, neat, and well organized results.



Exports the output into an html file that is very easy to scroll and navigate through.



Easy to export photos and WiFi connections data into a .kmz file that views their locations on
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the map using Google Earth.


Limits previewing data related to third party applications in the main results window. But it is
possible to navigate for third party details manually in the extracted reports from the tool
itself.



Requires third party applications to view PList and SQLite files.

iPhone Backup Extractor:


Organizes the backup folder into sub folders, separating third party applications from the iOS
files, which contains most of the iDevice related data.



Some files found using this tool were not captured through backup folder manual examination
such as TrustStore.sqlite3.



The output does not transmit the files to their related files in the backup folders and their
related SHA-1 file names.



It is not considered as a forensics tool.

Manual Examination:



Provides a lot of data which could be considered both good and bad. It is good
because the logical backup data is not missed if fully examined. It could be
considered bad because it is messy, randomly spread, and cumbersome to manually
examine since the Backup folders contain thousands of files.



Provides more digital evidence than other built-in applications installed on the device
like Twitter, Skype and Linkedin. Evidence includes user interactions with the
application, such as chat details, private messages sent/received, usernames and the
date/time stamps associated with these digital evidence.



Some of the databases found through manual examination contained information
synchronized between the user’s handheld mobile phone and the email address set up
on the iDevice. This can be of great relevance to certain investigations.



If certain installed application evidence is needed for an investigation, then this is the
most appropriate method for an investigator to use.

Differences between iOS 3 and iOS 4:
Previously conducted research on the backup folder of the iOS resulted in relating the backup files to
certain file names in SHA-1 hash values. It proved that those SHA-1 values were constant amongst
certain applications in any backup folder, which made it easier to fetch the desired data directly from
the backup folder without the need to go through each and every file.
This research revealed some changes to the iOS backup structure and illustrated how some of those
related SHA-1 values have changed across some applications as shown in Table 5.
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Table 4. Comparison between the tools

Cost

Logical Acquisition
Physical Acquisition
Automated
Built-in Image Viewer
Built-in Text Viewer
Deleted Data
Recovery
File Sorting
Third-party
applications data (e.g.
twitter, LinkedIn,
Skype, etc…)
Report Export
(HTML)

Katana Forensic
iPhone Backup
Lantern
Extractor
Government Rate
Free Edition
$599.00
Registered
Corporate Rate
$34.95
$699.00
Data Acquisition
Yes
Yes
*Released Post
No
Experiment
Analysis
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No

Manual Examination
Free

Yes
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Partial

Yes
Partial

No
Yes

Yes

No

No

Table 5. iOS 4 backup files compared to iOS 3 backup files
Backup

Notes

File
Type

iOS 4.10.01

iOS 3.1.2

Match?

SQLite

ca3bc056d4da0bbf88b5fb3be2
54f3b7147e639c
52c03edfc4da9eba398684afb6
9ba503a2709667
2041457d5fe04d39d0ab48117
8355df6781e6858
d351344f01cbe4900c9e981d1f
b7ea5614e7c2e5
d1f062e2da26192a6625d9682
74bfda8d07821e4
5d04e8e7049cdf56df0bf82482
0cddb1db08a8e2
01e25a02a0fccbd18df66862ad
23a2784b0fe534
bdadf7ce9d86a2b33c9ba65373
11538f48e03996

ca3bc056d4da0bbf88b5fb3be2
54f3b7147e639c
N/A

Yes

PList
SQLite

Calendar

PList
SQLite

Bookmarks

PList
SQLite

History

PList
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N/A

2041457d5fe04d39d0ab48117
8355df6781e6858.mddata
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

04cc352fd9943f7c0c3f0781d4
834fa137775761.mddata
N/A

No

1d6740792a2b845f4c1e6220c
43906d7f0afe8ab.mddata

Yes

N/A
No
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6. CONCLUSION
In sum, automated tools provide instant and visual evidentiary data from investigated iPads. Each
automated tool has different capabilities; therefore different sets of results can be obtained from each
tool. However, the manual examination provides more thorough and detailed evidentiary data from
investigated iPads. This research points out that forensic software developers need to advance the
capabilities of their automated tools. A robust technology that is capable of easing the manual
examination process is needed. Overall, the authors propose that if a quick triage of an iOS device is
needed, then an automated tool would suffice. However, if a more thorough examination is needed,
especially if unique installed application data is needed, then the manual examination process should
be utilized.
7. FUTURE WORK
On April 12, 2011, AccessData released the “Mobile Phone Examiner Plus (MPE +),” which is a
standalone cell phone forensics application (AcessData, April 12, 2011). The main feature of this
software solution is its ability to obtain the physical image of the iPad, iPhone and iPod Touch without
jailbreaking the iOS device (AccessData, 2011). Another software application that supports the
physical acquisition of iOS devices is the Lantern Light Physical Imager, which was due to be released
in mid October 2011 (KatanaForensics, 2011a). These tools should be tested in order to assure that
they are operating as required (Baggili, Mislan, & Rogers, 2007). Further studies should attempt to
examine the error rates in the forensic tools used when examining iOS devices. Lastly, this research
points to the direction of creating an extensible software framework for examining digital evidence on
iOS devices. This framework should allow the forensic software to continuously be updated with
backup file signatures depending on the version of the iOS. It should also allow the software to update
signatures of backup files for newly released iOS applications.
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